Police pursuits
Sometimes, and this is one of the harder claims on this site. The Supreme Court has twice approved deadly force to end a dangerous high-speed chase, and where a chase ends in a crash with no seizure, the constitutional test is whether the officer acted with a purpose to cause harm. That is a high bar. The claims that succeed are usually about force used when the danger had passed, or they are state-law negligence claims with short notice periods. This page says plainly which is which.
A police pursuit becomes a constitutional claim in two situations. The first is when officers use force to end it, by ramming, by shooting or by a roadblock, and the force was objectively unreasonable for the danger the chase actually posed. The second, which is rare, is when there was no seizure at all and an officer acted with a purpose to cause harm that had nothing to do with making an arrest.
Most people hurt in chases fall between those two: the pedestrian at the intersection, the driver struck by the fleeing car, the passenger who asked the driver to stop. For them the federal claim is usually weak and the state-law negligence claim is where the case is, if there is one. That claim has the shortest deadlines on this site, so the question is worth answering early.
How it happens
- A chase over something minor. Officers pursue a car at high speed through residential streets or past a school over a traffic infraction, an equipment violation or a stolen plate.
- Ramming and forced spins. A patrol car strikes the rear quarter of the fleeing car to spin it out, at a speed and in a place where a rollover or a collision with someone else is likely.
- Shots at the car. Officers fire at a moving vehicle or into one that has been boxed in, with passengers inside.
- The bystander. The fleeing car, or a patrol car running a red light, hits a pedestrian, a cyclist or another driver who had nothing to do with any of it.
- The passenger. A person riding in the fleeing car, with no control over the driver, is hurt in the crash or by the gunfire that ends it.
- The chase that was called off. A supervisor orders the pursuit ended, or department policy forbids it for the offense involved, and the officer continues.
The claim
The first question is whether there was a seizure, because that decides which part of the Constitution applies.
If police used force to stop you: the Fourth Amendment. Applying physical force with intent to restrain is a seizure, even if the person escapes (Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306 (2021)). Ramming a car and shooting at its driver are both seizures, and both are judged for objective reasonableness under Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989): the severity of the crime, the immediate threat, and whether the person was fleeing. Deadly force against a fleeing suspect requires probable cause to believe the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others (Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)). Since Barnes v. Felix, No. 23-1239, 605 U.S. ___ (2025), reasonableness is judged on the totality of the circumstances with no temporal cutoff, so the decisions that led to the final moment are part of the picture.
What the Supreme Court has done with those rules in chase cases. It has sided with the officers both times. Ramming a fleeing car to end a dangerous high-speed chase was reasonable (Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007)). Firing 15 shots to end a dangerous chase did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and the officers would have had qualified immunity in any event (Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014)). Both decisions rest on the word "dangerous." The argument in a plaintiff's case is that the chase was not dangerous to anyone until the police made it so, or that the danger was over when the force was used: the car was stopped, boxed in, or out of room.
If there was no seizure: substantive due process. A bystander struck by accident was not seized, and neither was a fleeing driver who crashed without being touched. For them the claim is under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the test is whether the officer's conduct "shocks the conscience." In a pursuit, only a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest meets it (County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998)). Recklessness is not enough. Poor judgment is not enough. We say that plainly because many people are told otherwise.
Where state law fits, and what this page does not publish
A negligence claim under state law does not require a purpose to harm, which is why bystander and passenger cases usually live there. Pennsylvania's immunity statute lists vehicles among the negligence exceptions under which a local agency can be liable (42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)), with damages capped at $500,000 per occurrence (§ 8553). Florida waives immunity up to caps of $200,000 per person and $300,000 per incident (Fla. Stat. § 768.28(5)(a)). The specific standard of care New York and New Jersey apply to emergency driving, and any pursuit immunity in those states, are not in this site's verified ledger, so they are not stated here. Ask a lawyer before assuming either way, and ask inside the notice period.
What they will argue
The driver caused it. The first defense in every pursuit case is that the person who fled is responsible for everything that followed. That argument is weakest for the people who did not flee: the bystander and the passenger.
Scott and Plumhoff control. Defense lawyers cite these two cases as if they approve any force in any chase. They approve force to end a chase that posed a real danger to others. A low-speed pursuit on an empty road, or shots fired into a car that was already pinned, is a different set of facts.
No seizure, so no Fourth Amendment. If the officers did not intend to stop the person who was hurt, the defense moves the case under Lewis, where the purpose-to-harm standard ends most claims.
Qualified immunity. The officer is shielded unless clearly established law put the question beyond debate (Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)). Plumhoff was decided on immunity in the alternative, and courts may skip the merits and go straight to it (Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)). See qualified immunity. For NYPD officers, New York City law removes the defense for its own excessive force claim (N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-802, 8-804).
The department's policy is not the Constitution. They will say that breaking a pursuit policy is not the same as breaking the Fourth Amendment. The policy is still evidence of what the officer was trained to do, and it matters to a claim against the municipality, which is liable only for its own policy, custom or deliberately indifferent training (Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)).
Your conviction bars the claim. A driver convicted of fleeing or of assault with the vehicle faces Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which bars a damages claim that would necessarily imply the conviction is invalid. It does not reach a passenger or bystander who was never charged.
What people have recovered
No public figure is published here for a pursuit case. Our ledger of public recoveries in New York, New Jersey, Florida and Pennsylvania has no verified entry for one. A reported New Jersey pursuit payment was looked at and left out because we could not confirm it from a source we would cite. The public settlements page lists what we have verified, by state.
What can be said is how the route affects the recovery. A federal claim against an individual officer has no statutory cap, allows punitive damages for reckless or callous indifference to federal rights (Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983)), and carries attorney's fees for a prevailing plaintiff (42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)), but in a pursuit case it is hard to establish. A state-law negligence claim is easier to establish and is limited by the caps above in Florida and Pennsylvania, with no punitive damages against a Florida agency (Fla. Stat. § 768.28(5)(a)). What a case is worth depends on the injury, the evidence and the defenses. See what a case is worth.
The clock
Because so many pursuit cases depend on state law, the notice column matters more here than on most pages. It runs from the day of the crash.
| State | Federal claim, Section 1983 | State-law claim: notice | State-law claim: suit |
|---|---|---|---|
| New York | Three years (N.Y. CPLR 214(5); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989)) | Notice of claim within 90 days to a city or county; in a death case, 90 days from the appointment of the estate's representative (N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-e(1)(a)). Claims against the State go to the Court of Claims within 90 days (Court of Claims Act § 10(3)) | One year and 90 days against a municipality; wrongful death within two years of the death (§ 50-i(1)) |
| New Jersey | Two years (N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2) | Tort Claims Act notice within 90 days (N.J.S.A. 59:8-8); a late notice only on motion within one year, on extraordinary circumstances (N.J.S.A. 59:8-9) | No suit until six months after the notice; barred after two years (N.J.S.A. 59:8-8) |
| Florida | Four years (Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)) | Written claim to the agency within three years, two years for wrongful death (Fla. Stat. § 768.28(6)) | The agency has six months to act; suit within four years (§ 768.28(6), (14)) |
| Pennsylvania | Two years (42 Pa.C.S. § 5524; Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2009)) | Written notice to the government unit within six months, and to the Attorney General for a Commonwealth agency (42 Pa.C.S. § 5522(a)) | Two years for personal injury or death (42 Pa.C.S. § 5524) |
No state notice rule applies to the federal claim (Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988)). In New York a court may allow a late notice of claim, but only on an application made before the limitation period runs (N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-e(5)). The New York, New Jersey, Florida and Pennsylvania pages go through each rule.
If you were the driver and a charge from the chase is still open, talk to your defense lawyer before you describe the pursuit to anyone, including us. See the criminal case and the civil case.
Police shootings
When the chase ended in gunfire. The deadly force rules and who sues after a death.
Police shootings →Excessive force
Force used after the car stopped is judged like any other force, second by second.
Excessive force →Failure to protect
When the government's duty to keep you safe exists, and when it does not.
Failure to protect →Common questions
I was a bystander hit during a police chase. Can I sue under Section 1983?
It is difficult. If the police did not intend to stop you, you were not seized, and under County of Sacramento v. Lewis a pursuit with no seizure violates the Constitution only where the officer acted with a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the arrest. Most bystander cases are brought under state negligence law instead, which has short notice deadlines: 90 days in New York and New Jersey, six months in Pennsylvania.
The police rammed my car to stop me. Is that excessive force?
Ramming a car is a seizure, and it is judged for reasonableness. In Scott v. Harris the Supreme Court held that ramming a fleeing car to end a dangerous high-speed chase was reasonable. The cases that go the other way involve chases that were not dangerous to anyone, or force used after the car had stopped.
I was a passenger and had no control over the driver. Does that matter?
It matters to the facts, but this site does not publish a separate legal test for passengers, because none is in our verified sources. If police used force to stop the car, a passenger hurt by that force can argue the Fourth Amendment applies. If they did not, the County of Sacramento v. Lewis standard does. A passenger's case needs a lawyer's review of the specific sequence, and the state-law notice periods run in the meantime.
How long do I have?
For the federal claim: three years in New York, two in New Jersey, four in Florida, two in Pennsylvania. For a state-law negligence claim against a government body the notice periods are far shorter. The table on this page sets them out.
Tell us what happened.
One conversation with an attorney, in your language. We tell you which claims the facts support, which deadline runs first for the agency involved, what evidence to preserve this week, and whether a pending criminal case changes the timing. If it is not a case we can take, we say so and tell you where to go.
(718) 484-7510If a criminal charge is still open, talk to your defense lawyer before you describe the arrest to anyone, including us. English, Russian and Spanish in-house; an interpreter for any other language. Contingency fee, confirmed in writing before we begin.