Under color of law
Section 1983 reaches a person who acts under color of state law: someone using the authority a state or local government gave them. An on-duty police officer making an arrest is the plain case. The harder questions are who else the statute reaches, who it does not reach at all, and what to do when the officer worked for the wrong kind of government. This page goes through the ones the law answers clearly and says plainly which ones we do not publish an answer to.
Current as of September 2026. We re-check this page every quarter and after any change in the law.
The first element of every Section 1983 claim is the one people skip, because in most police cases it is obvious. It stops being obvious the moment the defendant is not a uniformed officer on a city payroll doing police work: a special patrolman, a state official, a federal agent, a private guard, an officer working a second job. Some of those questions have clear answers in the statute and the Supreme Court's decisions. Some do not have an answer we have verified, and this page says so rather than guess. The Section 1983 page covers the statute as a whole.
The words
Section 1983 reaches "every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State" deprives another of a federal right (42 U.S.C. § 1983). Two things in that phrase do the work. "Under color of" means the person was using, or purporting to use, authority that the state gave: a badge, a power to arrest, a key to a cell. It does not require that the state authorized the specific act; an arrest without probable cause is unlawful and still made under color of law, which is the whole point of the statute. And "of any State" fixes the source of the authority. State law, and the local law of a city or county that draws its power from the state, count. Federal law does not.
For the defendants in most police abuse cases, the element is met on the face of the complaint. A New York City police officer who stops, searches, arrests or strikes a person while on duty is acting under color of New York law. A Department of Correction officer on Rikers Island, a county sheriff's deputy, a New York State Trooper, a New Jersey municipal officer and a Florida deputy are all in the same position. The contested questions are about the edges.
The State itself cannot be sued for damages
The most important edge is the one that removes a defendant entirely. In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), the Supreme Court held that a State and its agencies are not "persons" under Section 1983. A state official sued in his official capacity for damages is, in law, the State, and the claim fails. The same official may be sued in his personal capacity, and that is how a Section 1983 case against a State Trooper or a state prison guard is brought: against the officer, individually, for what the officer did.
What this changes in a case against the State Police or DOCCS
The federal claim names the individual officers and not the State or the agency. The state-law claim against the State of New York goes to the Court of Claims, where the claim or a notice of intention must be filed and served within 90 days of accrual (N.Y. Court of Claims Act § 10(3)). The New York page goes through the Court of Claims route, and the deadline tool counts it.
A city is different. A municipality is a "person" under the statute, but it is liable only for its own policy or custom, never simply because its officer was (Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). The Monell page is about that question. Under state law the City answers for its employees' torts directly, through the notice of claim, which is why the state claims matter.
Who the New York City law reaches
New York City's own civil rights law, added in 2021 as Chapter 8 of Title 8 of the Administrative Code, has its own definition of who can be sued, and it is narrower than Section 1983. The law applies to a "covered individual," defined as an employee of the New York City Police Department or a special patrolman (N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-801). A civil action lies against the covered individual and against the employer (§ 8-803). A special patrolman is, under the City's definition, covered by the same law as a police officer, and the City as employer is a defendant without the Monell showing. The city law page goes through what the chapter adds and what it does not cover: it does not reach Department of Correction officers, other municipalities' police, or the State.
| Defendant | Section 1983 | State law | NYC Admin. Code ch. 8 |
|---|---|---|---|
| NYPD officer, on duty | Yes, personal capacity | Yes, with the City as employer via notice of claim | Yes: a "covered individual" |
| Special patrolman | Question not published here | Depends on the employer | Yes: a "covered individual" |
| City of New York | Only for a policy or custom (Monell) | Yes, via notice of claim within 90 days | Yes, as employer (§ 8-803) |
| NYC Department of Correction officer | Yes, personal capacity | Yes, with the City via notice of claim | No: not a covered individual |
| New York State Trooper, DOCCS officer | Yes, personal capacity only | Against the State, in the Court of Claims | No |
| State of New York, its agencies | No (Will) | Court of Claims, 90 days | No |
| Federal officer (ICE, CBP, FBI, Marshals) | No | Federal Tort Claims Act against the United States | No |
The federal gap
Section 1983 does not reach a federal officer, because a federal officer acts under federal law and the statute reaches action under color of the law "of any State." For decades the gap was filled in part by Bivens, a judge-made damages claim against federal officers for constitutional violations. It is now very narrow. In Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022), the Supreme Court refused to recognize a Bivens claim for Fourth Amendment excessive force by a Border Patrol agent, or for First Amendment retaliation, and described extending Bivens as "a disfavored judicial activity."
What remains is the Federal Tort Claims Act, a claim against the United States itself for the torts of its employees. The Act's general exception for intentional torts does not apply to "investigative or law enforcement officers," those empowered to execute searches, seize evidence or make arrests, for assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process and malicious prosecution (28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)). The claim has its own clock: it must be presented in writing to the agency within two years of accrual, suit may not be filed until the agency has finally denied it, a failure to act within six months may be treated as a denial, and suit must be filed within six months after the denial is mailed (28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2675(a)). The ICE and federal officers page goes through the route, and the deadline tool counts it.
Which government employed the officers is the first question
A joint operation can put a city officer, a state officer and a federal agent in the same room, and each is reached by a different statute with a different clock: a notice of claim within 90 days for the city officer, a Court of Claims filing within 90 days for the state officer, and an administrative claim within two years for the federal agent. We identify the employer of every officer in the first week, from the paperwork and the footage, and protect the shortest clock first.
The questions we do not publish an answer to
Two color-of-law questions come up often and are not answered on this site, because the rules that decide them are not in our verified ledger and we do not publish law we have not checked against a primary source.
The first is the off-duty officer: an officer who was not working when the incident happened, or was working a second job, and who may or may not have invoked police authority. Whether that officer acted under color of law is decided by a test we have not published here. The second is private security: a guard, a bouncer, a store detective or a contractor who detained, searched or hurt someone, sometimes alongside police. Whether a private actor can be reached under Section 1983 is decided by tests we have not published here either. Both are fact-specific, and both are questions to bring to a lawyer with the facts rather than to assume from a web page. What we can say is that the state-law torts against the individual, and any claim against the person's employer, do not depend on the color of law element at all, so the absence of a Section 1983 claim is not the absence of a case.
Where the case is heard
A Section 1983 claim against a state or local officer can be heard in state court or federal court. State courts have concurrent jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court held in Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729 (2009), that New York could not strip its own courts of Section 1983 damages suits against correction officers. A defendant may remove a state-court case to federal court within 30 days of receiving the pleading (28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1)). New York cases are governed by Second Circuit precedent, New Jersey by the Third, and Florida by the Eleventh (28 U.S.C. § 41).
If a charge is pending
Identifying the officers and their employer is something we do from records, not from your account. If a charge from the same incident is pending, talk to your defense lawyer before describing the arrest to anyone, and do not name officers in writing; the criminal case and civil case page explains why.
Suing the city
Why the City is not liable just because its officer was, and the policy, custom and failure-to-train routes that reach it.
Monell →Federal officers
Section 1983 stops at the state line. Bivens after Egbert, and the Federal Tort Claims Act route against ICE and CBP.
Federal officers →The New York City law of 2021
Who a covered individual is, the City as employer, no immunity defense, and the three-year clock.
The city law →Common questions
Can I sue the State of New York under Section 1983?
No. The Supreme Court held in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police that a State and its agencies are not persons under Section 1983, and that a state official sued in an official capacity for damages is the State. The same official can be sued in a personal capacity, so a case about a State Trooper or a state prison guard names the officer individually. The state-law claim against the State goes to the Court of Claims, with its own 90-day clock.
The officer was off duty. Do I still have a claim?
That depends on a test we do not publish here, because the rule that decides when an off-duty officer acts under color of law is not in our verified ledger. It is a fact-specific question about what the officer did and what authority he invoked. Bring the facts to a lawyer; do not assume the answer either way.
The officers were ICE or Border Patrol. Does Section 1983 apply?
No. The statute reaches action under color of the law of any State, and federal officers act under federal law. The routes against federal officers are what is left of Bivens after Egbert v. Boule and the Federal Tort Claims Act, which has a two-year administrative claim deadline. The ICE and federal officers page goes through both.
Who does the New York City civil rights law reach?
A covered individual, which the law defines as an employee of the New York City Police Department or a special patrolman, and the City as employer. It does not reach Department of Correction officers, other municipalities' police, or the State. The city law page explains it.
Tell us what happened.
One conversation with an attorney, in your language. We tell you which claims the facts support, which deadline runs first for the agency involved, what evidence to preserve this week, and whether a pending criminal case changes the timing. If it is not a case we can take, we say so and tell you where to go.
(718) 484-7510If a criminal charge is still open, talk to your defense lawyer before you describe the arrest to anyone, including us. English, Russian and Spanish in-house; an interpreter for any other language. Contingency fee, confirmed in writing before we begin.